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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

n:-:CENT DRUG COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-

\'S. - -

~T~\T ~~

TAX COl\I:\IISSION

)
Case
No.10384

OF TT'L'A H,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
S'l'ATE~IENT

OF NATURE OF CASE

The Appellant corporation was assessed with a franl'!1i~l' tax dcfiC'iency by the Respondent on the theory that
duriug the period it transacted business in Utah prior
to thr date of its corporate charter it was not subject
tu thr corporate tax.
TlJNPO~lrl'ION BEFORE STATE TAX COMMISSION
111

F'ollowing- a hearing on the assessment levied, the
unnission sustained the deficiency.
1

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHri_1
The Appellant petitions the Court to reverse tlie Di
cision of the commission and to hold that tl1e cor'}JO ration 's accountant correctly filed the Appellant's return:,
and that the deficiency was incorrectly assessed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are uncontroverted, being stipulated ]y
counsel below. Stipulation of Facts.
1

Pearl M. Vincent, dba Vincent Drug Company, :1
single proprietorship, was engaged in the general drur.:
store and prescription business for many years prior t11
1962. Business was conducted at 21 North Main S!reel.
~Iidvale, Utah.
On January 2, 1962, Articles of Incorporation werl'
filed for the Appellant in the office of the Secretary of
State. The filing and license fees totaling $45 were paid
at that time. Mrs. Vincent transferred all of lier imc11
tory and business assets to the Appellant for its capital
stock. The incorporators concluded all preparatiou-,
certificates of stock were issued, and business began
Near the end of January, 1962, the Secretary of Stak
returned the Articles to counsel for the Appellant, a(l\'i'·
ing that the street addresses of the incorporators anil
initial directors had been omitted, contrary to the requirements of the new Business Corporation Act whii·li
had become effective the day prior to the filing. Cha1Jtcr
16-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The license nncl filinc
fees were not returned.
2

After the filing but prior to the return of the Arti-

cles, counsd for the Appellant terminated his private
pracl ic< in order to accept federal employment. Although
a chang-e of address card was properly filed with the
lnited States Post Office, the Articles were delivered to
, 11w1scl 's former office, and were not obtained by him,
1wr \l'HS he aware of their return, for several weeks.
1

'l'hereaftcr, on May 2, 1962, the Articles, amended
to include the street addresses of the incorporators and
llirectors, were filed and the Certificate of Incorporation
1ras issued by the Secretary of State.
As permitted by law, the Appellant elected to conduct its business on a fiscal year ending March 31. A
corporate tax return was properly prepared by the corporation's accountant for the period of January 2, 1962
to l\Iarch 31, 1962, and was timely filed. Additionally,
the Appellant used this initial tax return as the basis
for computing its corporate franchise tax liability for
tho ensuing year as required by Section 59-13-21, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. The total tax liability for the
1·rporte(l period and for the following taxable year
amom1tetl to $24.92, which sum was accepted with the
rotnrn by the Respondent.

The Appellant's accountant properly prepared and
tiled the tax return for the fiscal year ended March 31,
lll6:l, and the tax liability of $737.37 was paid. The Re'POlldPnt accepted the return and the corporation's check.
011 Ft·hruary 20, 1964, the Respondent advised the
\ i'i"·llm1t that for franchise tax purposes the date of the

Certificate of Incorporation, l\Iay 2, 19G2, '''a8 eontrolliii~
The initial return filed hy the A ppella11t for tl1f· 111 .1J 1,,
ended March 31, 1962, and the accompanying cominit;,.
tions for the prepaid tax of the first complete taxa\11,.
year were therefore unacceptable. The Hespoude11t ]H,ld
that the return filed by the corporation for the year ('lid«!
.:\farch 31, 1963, was its first valid return, and comimtl'ii
the tax for the following year upon that ba8e, makin~ :
total tax liability of $1,541.77, or a deficie11r~' of $1G!l.4~.
The taxpa3'er was assessed for the additional tax allr1!'l"I
to be due. The Respondent has not questioned the Clf'l'll·
racy or content of the returns filed - only their neers:;ih
1

1

Pursuant to the Appellant's petition, a hearing wn'
held before the State Tax Commission N ovem her 9, 1%!. 1
The Commission sustained the assessment and e11frn·1l ,
its written Decision April 20, 1965. It was therein ro11cluded by the Commission that:
'' 1. The franchise tax in Utah is a tax upo11 exrr·
cising the corporate franchise;
2. Petitioner commenced to exist as a eorpor:i.
tion only when all conditions precPdr11t JH
scribed by the Utah statute, including t!ir I'
suance 0°f a corporate charter, has l1t·c 1
complied with;
1

•

3. Corporation franchise tax doe8 not apply. t.11
an organization performing lmsinN.;8 art11 1·
ties in the guise of a corporation;
4. The deficiency against the Vi11ce11t J)rng C11n1·
1
. the amount o f' ·Ii''
&-('9
48 , \Olf/•J11·I
pany, Inc., m
J..
.....
with interest at the legal rate from ;111d aft·'
March 31, 1963, until paid, should I)(' ' 11 '.

4

tained.'' Decision, p. 2-3, Conclusions of
Law 1-4.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT 'l'HE UTAH CORPORATE TAX ON A
COHPORA TION NEWLY CREATED OR BEGINNING TO DO BUSINESS IN UTAH IS A
'r AX UPON THE PRIVILEGE OF DOING
BUSINESS WITHIN THE STATE.
11he Appellant finds itself in somewhat of a unique
Eituation in contending that it is liable for the franchise
tnx for a period greater than the State Tax Commission

is willi11g to accept. While the mathematical formula
dc·rised hy the Legislature is interesting, it is unimportant for tlie purpose of this action. The resulting anomaly,
ho\\'ETcr, is that to extend the period for which the taxp<wer iB liahle, as the Appellant petitions, would abate
the deficiency assessment herein made, and the decrease
!lie Appellant's tax liability.
The critical legislative provision is Section 59-13-21,
rtnl1 Code Annotated, 1953, which states:
"A Corporation which commences to do business
in this state shall upon incorporation or qualifi<'r1tion prepay the minimum tax of $10, and upon
the filing of its return ·within two months and
fifteen days after the close of its first taxable year
it f.:hall p;y a tax for the privilege of doing busillCRS in the state during the period covered by the
return, computed in the manner provided for the
computation of a tax based upon a return for a

5

fractional part of a year, with credit allowed fq
the amount prepaid.

1

"The tax to be paid by the corporation for t] 11 .
privilege of doing business in this state dmirw
the twelve-month period commencing with th~
expiration of its said first taxable year, 1>halJ 11:.
equal to an amount which bears the same ratin
to the sum determined as the tax for the rwriod
covered by the return, disregarding the' $10 minimum, as twelve bears to the number of mo1Ji]1,
included in such period, but in no event sliall
such tax be less than $10, and one quarter of sni1l
tax shall be due and payable at the time of filin~
its said first return; one quarter on or before fo1·
months and fifteen days after the close of its taxable year; one quarter on or before eight month>
and fifteen days after the close of its taxable
year; and one quarter on or before eleven month~
and fifteen days after the close of its taxablr
year.''
Thus, the franchise tax is not an income tax. It is neit!ter
a property tax nor an organization tax. As it respects a
corporation (as defined by the Legislature) newly organized, it is a tax imposed on the privilege of doi11is lmsiness in Utah. J.M. arnd M. S. Browning Co .v. State Ta
Commission, 107 Utah 457, 154 P. 2d 993. It is in JlO way
a tax upon the right to be a corporation, but solely 011 tl1r
right to transact business. As it has before been said.
the tax is upon the franchise ''to do,'' not upon the fran
chise "to be." In re Detroit and Windsor Perry Co., 23~
Mich. 574, 205 N.W. 102.
1

In construing the applicability and effect of taximr
statutes, this Court has ruled that that intPrpn·tati011
6

1

11 ill hl· adopted which lays the tax burden uniformly on
,1 11 ~tandiug in the same degree with relation to the tax
;idnptrd, and will avoid an interpretation which would
Ji•:id to a11 impractical, unfair or unreasonable result.
S1 rri!!e Y. 8talP, Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d
9:11, 12G .A.L.R. 1~318.
lt is therefore necessary that in deciding the issue
nn1r Jwfore this Court as to ·whether or not the Appellant,
Vi11ce11t Drug Company, Inc., was doing business in Utah
11·ithi11 the meaning of the statute and the contemplation
of the Legislature during the period of January 2, 1962

to ~Ia~· 2, 1962, the Court must adopt that position leading
tn ;i practical and equitable result consistent with the
statw.; of all entities subject to the corporate franchise
lax.

POINT II.
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS A DE FACTO
CORPORATION DURING THE PERIOD OF
.T.A NTT ARY 2, 1962 TO :MAY 2, 1962.
It is well settled in the law that a de facto corporatinn possesses all the powers of a de jure corporation
exf'ept that it is open to direct attack in quo warranto
procerdings hy the State to arrest its usurpation of
power. So long as the State does not initiate such an
af'tion, tl1c.• corporation is under the protection of the same
law ;rnd is governed by the same legal principles as a
eorporation de jure. Su:offord Brothers Dry Goods v.
1111·1'11, :17 Okla. 616, 133 P. 193. It is fundamental that the
7

legality of the existence of a corporation whicJi h·i··
1
( ,, 11'1•11
so far organized in compliance with statutorvJ re l!lllJ· \'.
ments as to have achieved a de facto existencr ramw
be questioned collaterally by the State or by any other
party. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Oregrm 8lwrt Liii
Railroad Co., 23 Utah 474, 65 P. 735. If the State, wliicJ1
alone can grant the authority to incorporate, rcm;in 1,
silent during an open and notorious assertion and ex~i
cise of corporate powers, it along with private individual,
and concerns will be estopped from raising any iuqnin
once the defect is corrected. Thus, if the Vince11t D111~
Company was a de facto corporation during the perio(l in
question, the State Tax Commission is now estopped from
asserting that the Appellant did not have such existern·(
and character as to make it liable for the corporate tnx.
The factors essential to the existence of a cle facto
corporation are :
1. A valid law under which a corporation with \Ii~

powers assumed might be incorporated;
2. A bona fide attempt to organize a corporation

under such law; and
3. An actual exercise of corporate powers. Brmcn 1·

Webb, 60 Ore. 526, 120 P. 387.
The Appellant had prepared its Articles of Imorpriration for filing with the Secretary of State. The Article>
were full and complete except for the omission of tt.i·
· · al rli·
street addresses of the incorporators an d ongm .
't I
rectors . The Purposes therein enumerated, the rapi <l
8

,tnw1me, and the corporate organization are la·wful and
1

11 11 u

11·a> \ iolatc the broad scope of authority permitted

The business
nim of the rorporntion and the powers with which it was
c]otl1L·d <He valid and were not questioned by the
11.'

il11

a pp! il'a bk~ statutory provisions.

uc~prmd('llt.

'rlte Artides \Vere properly filed and the license and
filing- fees were paid. An organization meeting was then
held with all tihareholders and directors present. Dircctor8 wcrP elected and officers appointed. Certificates
of stock vvere issued. The corporate seal was affixed to
nll dornments. By-Laws were prepared and adopted. A
corporate buy and sell agreement was executed with the
~liarcho1c1ers.

The husiness sign, advertising materials, licenses,
areou11ts with supplier, and official papers were all

chnuged to show the new business name. A checking
neeount 1rnti opened, and the Appellant began business
011 .Jmrnary 2, 1962.
Since then the corporation has conduded its business and has exercised and enjoyed its
rnrporat(~ existence.
From the foregoing facts, consistent with the Find-

ingR of Fact of the Commission, it is obvious that the rer1uiremeuts for existence as a de facto corporation were

met and demonstrated by the Appellant during the
pl'riod in question.

amply

fn Marsh v. Mathias, 19 Utah 350, 56 P. 1074, the

fads are substantially identical to those here under exam9

ination. This Court there said that ·where a bona firh
attempt was made to incorporate, and business was in
fact commenced, the entity was a de facto corporation.
It is therefore submitted that the Respondent i~
estopped from maintaining that the Appellant was nut
imbued with corporate power and existence during tJi,
months in question, but rather must concede that for
every purpose the corporation was cloaked with the guarantees, rights and obligations generally afforded corporations by the statutes of this State. Utah Light &
Traction Co. v. United States, Utah, 230 F. 343, 144 r.C.A.
485; Salina Ca.nyon Coal Co. v. Klemm, 76 Utah 372, 29n
P. 161. Any holding to the contrary would amount to a
collateral attack by the Commission on the Appellant',
existence. The deficiency cannot be sustained.

POINT III.
THAT A DE FACTO CORPORATION IS
LIABLE TO THE STATE FOR CORPORATE
FRANCHISE TAX.
In determining the intent of the Legislature regard
ing the Appellant's initial four months' existence, it ic
helpful to note the analogous problem of a foreign corporation doing business in Utah without properly
qualifying.
The questioned taxing statute treats foreign and domestic corporations alike. It states that the initial $1 11
prepayment is required at the time of "incorporation or
qualification." It then requires the computatio1 1 and
10

pa>·m<>Jlt in advance for the first full year of the corporation followi11g the expiration of its initial taxable period
for t lie rigl1t to do business.

'J'he Business Corporation Act permits a foreign corporatio11 to transact business in this State even though
it lws not complied with the statutory requirements for
qualificatiou. Section 16-10-120, Utah Code Annotated,
1U53. Its contracts and dealings are unaffected by its
lack of statutory authority. Having the same privileges
as a qualified foreign corporation, it must also be subject
to the same liabilities. The law >vill not permit a nonqw1lif>·ing foreign corporation to avoid taxation simply
lwcause the statute requires the initial tax "upon incorporation or qualification."
This very problem confronted the Court in 1956 in
the case of Nevada Trailer Finance Co. v. State Tax
('nJ/1111/ssion,. 5 Utah 2d 177, 299 P. 2d 126. The Court
thrre held that a foreign corporation, actually doing busillPss in Utah, could not escape liability for tax on the
grnunrl that it was not qualified to do business >vithin
tlw State. It should obtain no advantage over other
foreign corporations legally doing business in the State
h>· failing to comply with the terms of the statute.
The Legislature later expressly set forth its inte·nt
in the event such problems arose:
"A foreign corporation which transacts business
in this state ·without a certificate of authority shall
Le liable to this state, for the years or parts thereof during which it transacted business in this

11

state ·without a certificate of authority' ' in LJ!.1
amount equal to all fees and taxes whieh wr1 1,1.,
have been imposed hy the lmn; of this Rtate llJl"ii
such corporation had it duly applied for and
received a certificate of authority to transaet lm,i
ness in this state as required hy this act arn1 tlir·n•.
after filed all reports required hy this act, plus al:
penalties imposed by the laws of the statr• for
failure to pay such fees and taxes. The atto111r·i
general shall bring proceedings to reco,·er ail
amounts due this state under the provisio11~ of
this section." Section 16-10-120, Utah Cocle Annotated, 1953.
1111

Thus, the Legislature propounding that "A corporatior,
which commences to do business in this state shall uro11
incorporation or qualification . .. " (emphasis added) pa:·
corporate tax did not really intend to infer that a foreign corporation failing to qualify is not liable for thC'
tax. By the same reasoning, the Appellant claims that
the Legislature did not mean to shield a de facto corporation from the scope of the franchise tax. Rather,
the c1orpora,tion, foreign or domestic, unquai1ifiec1 or
de facto, is subject to the tax if it conducts its lrnsincs'
within the State - and that is the sole test.
The position of the Respondent is complete]~- n11·
tenable. The Commission's Decision creates a fonr·
month period during which the Appellant eondudeil
business and realized a taxable income, for whieh no 0111 ·
as the Respondent's position concedes, is subjert to ihi·
State's taxing authority. The directors and shareholil·
ers cannot be held liable for tax while the entity fuJtC·
tions as a de facto corporation. Marsh v. Mathias, s11 11ro

12

Jt the Corporation is not liable, the shareholders and
lmsinrss eujoy a dispensation relieving them from any
,Jiilig-ntioJJ for state tax until such time as their prot·cdure of incorporation is perfected. Thus, if the
lfrspo11dt>11t 's position is upheld, it is possible for a
grnup lo do as the Appellant did, only with the purpose
to nrnid tlte state taxing authority. The Legislature endca\'Orccl to preclude such a situation by broadly defining the group Fmbject to the franchise tax as including

" ... (1'J)very corporation, and every company,
joi11t-stock company, joint-stock association, business trust, society, or other association, organized
for profit and doing business in this state, wherein interest or ownership is evidenced by certifiratcs or other written instruments or wherein the
iuterrsts or rights of shareholders, members, as1-1ocia tes or beneficiaries are represented or evideueed by units or shares." Section 59-13-1 ( 3),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Tims, there are business entities not even required
to "incorporate or qualify" to do business in Utah, or
tu pay any filing or license fees, who fall within the
fo1·pgoi11g definition and are therefore subject to the
r·11rporate franchise tax. The Appellant, assuming the
privilege of doing business, came within the definition
of a "corporation," even though it had obtained no Certificate of Incorporation. A similar situation exists
under federal law where ''corporations'' subject to the
curporate income tax are broadly enough defined as to
i!1elude the Appellant. Section 7701, Internal Revenue
Corle.

13

In the final analysis, whether or not the Vincent Dru"
Company was a de facto corporation, it satisfied tb~
statutory requirements while doing business within tlil·
State. The Court must accede to the obvious legislatiri·
intent to tax every entity not specifically exempt, anrl
require the Appellant to pay the franchise tax from !Ji,,
day it began to do business.
POINT IV
THAT THE RESPONDENT ERRED IN ITS
COMPUTATION OF TAX AND INTEREST
ON THE ASSESSMENT LEVIED.
Without prejudice to the Appellant's contention~
hereinbefore stated, it is submitted in the event the Cour1
were to affirm the Commission's Conclusions of Law aJl(l
Decision, that the Respondent has erred in the computation of the deficiency assessment and in the additional
levy for interest.
The Commission held that the return filed by the
Appellant for the year ended March 31, 1963 was thl'
first return of the corporation acceptable to it urnler it'
interpretation of the taxing statutes. Decision, P. 2,
Finding of Fact 9. This return, however, included tl 1 ~
period of April 1, 1962 to May 2, 1962 during which the
Appellant functioned ·without benefit of a Certificate.

It would seem, in order to be consistent, that the
Respondent should accept only that portion of the n
.
turn that reflects operations
after M ay 2, lCJf'J
· 1"• anrl

14

.'dionld therefore grant the appropriate credit against the
,Jdicirnl'y.

Additionally, the Commission decreed that interest
un tlw ddiciency should be computed from March 31,
J9G3. Decision, P. 3, Conclusion of Law 4. As hereinIJeforc cited, Section 59-13-21 provides that the prepayment of tax due for the second taxable period of the
corporation can be made on an installment basis, with
thr due date of each installment expressly set forth.
Tlrns, interest on any deficiency can only be assessed from
the date upon which the quarterly portion of such deficieney became due, and then only upon that portion of
tlw assessment.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission
rrred in its consideration and interpretation of the statutes and law of this jurisdiction. On the basis of its de
facto existence, legislative intent, and a strict construction of applicable statutory provisions, the Appellant
must be held as being subject to the corporate franchise
tax from its inception, January 2, 1962.

Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
CRAIG T. VINCENT
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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